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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
The companion article argues that educational malpractice represents
a viable cause of action. This article suggests the contrary. Arguably, to
deny judicial relief for the tort of educational malpractice is essentially
inconsistent with historic tort principles as well as with the traditional
court role of providing injured parties with a forum for relief. Notwith-
standing this rationale, courts have been extremely reluctant to apply
simple negligence analysis to individual education negligence claims.'
There are two basic reasons why courts have not allowed educational
malpractice claims to succeed: the court system does not wish to interfere
in school administrative practices,2 and imposing negligence liability
would cause schools to suffer numerous burdensome claims.3 While ed-
ucational malpractice may be argued on the pleadings, a cause of action
has rarely been sustained. The critical question is whether the courts
should entertain these claims or whether they should be precluded based
on public policy. This article asserts that such claims should not be al-
lowed under current social and educational conditions.
This article explores the policy reasons which courts have adopted to
deny a private cause of action holding educators legally liable for defi-
ciencies in a student's education. The introductory section provides the
background on the basic issue of malpractice in education. Section two
examines educational malpractice case law focusing first on cases in-
volving negligence in basic academic skill instruction, then looking at
negligence in special education. Section three explores the various duty
of care arguments while section four discusses three alternate theories
for recovery. Section five analyzes the policy reasons for denial of the tort
of educational malpractice. New directions for an educational malpractice
claim against the education profession is the focus of section six. The
final section discusses the question of whether education itself is a profes-
sion in the malpractice sense.
B. Background Concerns
The current crisis in American education has fostered several lawsuits
by students against their schools for "educational malpractice," or the
' See, e.g., Robert H. Jerry, H, Recovery in Tort for Educational Malpractice:
Problems of Theory and Policy, 29 KAN. L. REv. 195 (1981).
2Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y.
1979).
3 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976).
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failure to educate.4 Most of the plaintiff-students graduated from high
school, even though they remained functionally illiterate. They lacked
the ability to form the mature and informed judgment requisite to secure
employment, or even to effectively manage their own lives. 5 "Functional
illiteracy" may be described as the general inability to apply the basic
skills in reading, writing, and arithmetic to problems of a practical nature
encountered in everyday life.6 These student lawsuits were based on var-
ious legal theories of recovery, the most common being negligence with
the root argument based on the plaintiff being functionally illiterate.
In professional negligence cases, the professional must possess and use
the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily employed by members of the
particular profession in good standing.7 Professional negligence cases
have involved doctors," dentists,9 pharmacists, 10 psychiatrists," lawyers,
1 2
4 For the purpose of this article "malpractice" is defined as:
[P]rofessional misconduct or unreasonable lack of skill. This term is usually
applied to such conduct by doctors, lawyers, and accountants. More specif-
ically, malpractice is the failure of one rendering professional services to
exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the
circumstances in the community by the average, prudent, reputable member
of the profession with the result of injury, loss or damage to the recipient
of those services or those entitled to rely upon them. It is any professional
misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary
duties, evil practice, or illegal or immoral conduct.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (5th ed. 1979). Even though "educational mal-
practice" has not been recognized as a legally remediable cause of action, the
court has used the term "educational malpractice" in reference to complaints
against educators alleging professional misconduct paralleling legal or medical
malpractice. "Educational malpractice", will therefore refer to professional mis-
conduct of educators. Nevertheless, the discussion will also include actions against
educators based upon grounds of constitutional and contract law, as well as neg-
ligence.
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976) (student-plaintiff graduated but was not able to read and write above
the fifth grade level despite graduation from high school, thus limiting employ-
ment other than labor which requires little or no ability to read or write); Donohue
v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979) (student-plaintiff
lacked ability to comprehend written English on a level sufficient to enable him
to complete an application for employment); Myers v. Medford Lakes Bd. of Educ.,
489 A.2d 1240 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (student-plaintiff's action was for
failure by the school district to provide him with special remedial education to
assist him to overcome his academic deficiencies).
I See Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 258 (M.D. Fla. 1979), affd in
part and vacated in part, 644 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of a Florida statute requiring passage of a minimum competency test
before receiving a high school diploma, although unconstitutional as applies to
plaintiff because of lack of notice).
7WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS, at 187 (5th ed. 1984).
1 See, e.g., Walls v. Boyett, 226 S.W.2d 552 (Ark. 1950); De Laughter v. Womack,
164 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1964).
1 Willard v. Hagemeister, 175 Cal. Rptr. 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Rice v.
Jaskolski, 313 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1981).
,o Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich Ct. App. 1971) (pregnancy from phar-
macist's negligence in filling a prescription for oral contraceptive with a tran-
quilizer); French Drug Co. v. Jones, 367 So. 2d 431 (Miss. 1978).
1" Ray v. Ameri-Care Hosp., 400 So. 2d 1127 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Cotton v.
Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
12 See, e.g., Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239 (La. 1972);
McLellan v. Fuller, 108 N.E. 180 (1915).
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architects and engineers, 13 accountants,14 and many other professions and
trades.15 Generally, professionals are required not only to exercise rea-
sonable care, but also to possess a certain degree of special knowledge or
ability. 16 The law requires conduct of professionals which is consistent
with their superior learning and experience, as well as any special skills,
knowledge, and training which they possess over and above that normally
held by persons in their particular field. 17 Most courts have denied edu-
cational malpractice claims 8 even while consistently recognizing mal-
practice actions against various professional groups.' 9 Only one state
court has included educators among the professions liable for malprac-
tice. 2
0
The very fact that school systems are specifically designed and usually
required to educate students provides the argument that failure to do so
is a clear example of unreasonable and socially harmful conduct. However,
individuals are legally responsible only for acts and omissions which the
law recognizes as unjustified. 21 The courts must initially find that the
failure to educate is a justified claim.
The courts have generally refused to recognize educational malpractice
as a legally remediable cause of action. Among the causes of action which
have not been recognized by the courts are the following: an action for
damages against a school district for negligent teaching, placement, or
classification of students suffering from dyslexia;22 action on behalf of a
child against a school district for negligently placing child in classes for
the mentally retarded under circumstances where the district knew or
should have known that the child was not in fact retarded;23 an action
13 Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 325 A.2d 432 (Md. 1974); City of Eveleth v.
Ruble, 225 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1975).
14 Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979); Bonhiver v.
Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451
A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1982).
1- Chamness v. Odum, 399 N.E.2d 238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (chiropractor); Fan-
tini v. Alexander, 410 A.2d 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (karate teacher);
Health v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526 (N.C. 1979) (pilot), Bambert v. Central
Gen. Hosp., 77 A.D.2d 559, (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (nurse).
16 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 185.
17Id.
Is See D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska
1981); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976);
Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 453 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979); Hoffman v. Bd. of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317,
(N.Y. 1979); Torres v. Little Flower Children's Serv., 474 N.E.2d 223, (N.Y. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); DeRosa v. City of New York, 517 N.Y.S.2d 754
(1987).
Is PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 185-86.
20 B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
21 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 4. "Not only may a morally innocent
person be held liable for the damage done, but many a scoundrel has been guilty
of moral outrages, such as base ingratitude, without committing any tort. It is
legal justification which must be looked to..." Id.
22 D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska
1981).
23 Smith v. Alameda County Social Serv. Agency, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979).
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against a high school where plaintiff graduated, yet remained function-
ally illiterate;24 an action which alleged misclassification and improper
placement in a special education program for several years to student's
detriment; 5 an action brought by a former student and parents alleged
the negligent evaluation and placement of a learning disabled student;2 6
complaint against a school board, elementary school principal, and
teacher for educational malpractice in negligently evaluating child's
learning abilities; 27 an educational malpractice claim against school board
for failure to provide the plaintiff with special remedial education to assist
him in overcoming his academic deficiencies;28 an action against the social
services department and child care agency with which a former student
who remained functionally illiterate was placed after his abandonment
by his mother;29 an action which alleged that a school board negligently
failed to assess plaintiffs intellectual ability and placing him in special
education program for children with retarded mental development;30 a
claim that notwithstanding receipt of a certificate of high school gradu-
ation, plaintiff remained functionally illiterate;31 an action which alleged
educational malpractice in the school by negligently evaluating and plac-
ing plaintiff in a special educational facility after being suspended from
school for assaulting teacher with a knife;3 2 a claim that school officials
promoted the plaintiff in school through twelfth grade without teaching
him to read, while nurturing his athletic ability at the expense of his
formal education.
33
II. EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE CASE LAW
A. Basic Academic Skill Instruction
Even a cursory review of educational malpractice case law establishes
a clear distinction between malpractice claims for the failure of the school
system to provide basic academic skills and malpractice claims for a school
system's failure to implement its guaranteed policies and procedures in
a specific area such as special education. In the special education area,
student diagnosis, classification and placement is required and creates a
specialized set of circumstances.
34
24 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
25Thbell v. Dade County Pub. Sch., 419 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
26 Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 453 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982).
27 Hunter v. Rd. of Educ., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982).
28 Myers v. Medford Lake Bd. of Educ., 489 A.2d 1240 (1985).
29 Torres v. Little Flower Children's Serv., 474 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
10 Hoffman v. Bd. of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979).
3' Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, (N.Y. 1979).
2 Washington v. City of New York, 422 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1981).
11 Denson v. Steubenville Bd. of Educ., No. 85-J-31 (Ohio Ct. App. July 29,
1986).
- 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-62 (1988).
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The first court decision to consider whether there should be a cause of
action for educational negligence was Peter W. v. San Francisco University
Unified School District.35 The controlling question in Peter W. was whether
public policy should allow the recognition of a duty to teach basic academic
skills to students.36 The recognition of a duty to teach basic academic
skills would imply that students failing to learn would have a potential
legal claim. The court refused to impose a duty on educators grounding
their decision on the following public policy positions:
1. Because no standards of care exist for educators, the court should
not, unilaterally, establish such standards;
2. Establishing a duty on educators would invite judicial interference
with the daily administration of schools;
3. So many factors influence the eventual outcome of a child's educa-
tional experience that plaintiffs cannot directly establish a sufficient
nexus between the injury and educator;
4. As long as schools provide administrative remedies to correct griev-
ances, the courts believe they should not interfere;
5. The tort of educational malpractice would expose education to truly
burdensome litigation.
3
7
In Peter W, the plaintiff, a high school graduate who was unable to
read beyond the fifth-grade level, was allowed to graduate from high
school. He then sued the school district, the superintendent, the school
board and individual school board members, alleging negligence in the
failure of the defendants to provide him with basic academic instruction
which they had a duty to provide. Based on the aforementioned public
policy considerations, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, holding
that it would create an impossible duty on educators to require them to
impart basic academic skills to students.38
Thus, while sanctioning educational malpractice as a new area of tort
liability, the court refused to exercise its newly created discretion.39 The
court's reasoning was direct and simple: educational approaches and tech-
niques presently provide no standard of care, duty, or injury.40 Further-
more, there are many socio-emotional, physical and environmental factors
which impact on a student's ability to become educationally successful. 41
The public policy impact would be immense if schools were subjected to
such burdensome litigation at a time when they are already enduring
serious budget constraints. 42 Additionally, to impose the burden of a tort
for educational malpractice would create a condition which was not in-
3560 Cal. App.3d at 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
36 60 Cal. App.3d at 822, 131 Cal. at 859. "[J]udicial recognition of... duty
... is initially to be dictated or preclude considerations of public policy." Id.
37 Id.
38 d.
19 Id. at 860.
4o Id.
41 Peter W. v. San Francisco University United Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854,
861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).42 Id.
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tended by the state legislators. 43 The California education regulations
were not intended to guarantee educational results or even to guard
against injury; they were administrative provisions, not protective ones.44
The counterargument of plaintiffs who advocated an educational mal-
practice cause of action did not withstand analysis. These arguments were
based on the state education code, the California administrative code,
and the state constitutional provisions which required schools to keep
parents apprised of their child's academic progress, to instruct children
in the basic skills of reading and writing, to not graduate students who
have not demonstrated proficiency in basic skills, and to design the cur-
riculum to meet the needs of the pupil. The plaintiff contended that this
imposed a "mandatory duty" on the defendants,45 based on Government
Code § 815.6, which provided that if an enactment imposes a mandatory
duty, "the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately
caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity es-
tablishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty."
4
6
The Peter W. court held that the state constitutional provisions were not
the type of enactments to which Government Code § 815.6 applied. That
code section applied to enactments intended to protect against injury
while these education provisions were purely administrative.
47
A similar educational malpractice case was Donohue v. Copiague Union
Free School District.4 Donohue, the plaintiff, argued that the district
promoted him from grade to grade without accurately determining his
ability to learn.49 Due to this omission, Donohue lacked the basic ability
to comprehend anything in writing, even a job application form. 50
The court refused to recognize the Donohue's claim regardless of
whether causation could be established or injury had occurred, holding
that the regulation of a school system belongs to school officials. 51 The
court stated that to recognize this cause of action would result in judicial
review and "blatant interference" with the daily administration of the
public school system. 52 Additionally, the court pointed out that students
and parents had an alternate remedy: aggrieved parties could seek ad-
ministrative remedies within the educational system.
53
B. Negligence in Special Education Areas
Cases such as Peter W. and Donohue develop because of a school system's
alleged failure to adequately teach essential academic skills. Other cases
41 Id. at 862.
44 Id.
41 Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862 n.5.
46 Id. at 862 n.6.
41 Id. at 862.
48 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
41 Id. at 1353.
50 Id.
-- 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 1979).
52 Id.
" Id. at 1355.
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involve a more traditional and specific type of negligence. This second
type of case involves negligence in the placement or removal from special
education programs or an initial misclassification of a student with an
educational handicap. Even though there are distinctions between these
types of claims, the courts' application of a policy analysis has rejected
both classifications of malpractice claims.
54
The first and representative case of this second type is Hoffman v. Board
of Education.55 Following Peter W. and Donohue, the courts have, to date,
rejected this second type of classification of educational malpractice
claims wherein the allegation involves improper diagnosis, classification
and placement rather than the failure to teach basic academic skills.56
Daniel Hoffman, a kindergarten student, was tested by a trained and
certified school clinical psychologist for potential educational handicap.
Daniel's intelligence quotient led to a recommendation for placement in
a class for the mentally retarded; but, because Daniel had a speech im-
pediment (which made the IQ assessment questionable), a re-evaluation
was recommended within two years. Over the next ten years, no re-
evaluation was conducted. When the school did retest, it was determined
that he was not retarded. Daniel's school for handicapped children which
he had been attending for thirteen years then refused to re-admit him
because he no longer met their eligibility standards.
5 7
The plaintiff alleged that the school board was negligent in its initial
assessment of Daniel's intellectual ability and in its placement of Daniel
in a special education classroom, as well as in its failure to re-test Daniel
as per the recommendation of the school psychologist.58 Daniel claimed
injury as a result of severe emotional detriment and lower intellectual
attainment as well as reduced future employment opportunities. 59 Al-
though the trial court awarded damages of $750,000 and the appellate
court affirmed the verdict as to liability (although reducing the damage
award to $500,000), the New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court decisions based on Donohue.60
The Court of Appeals reasoning is instructive and clearly demonstrates
why educational malpractice is not a viable cause of action at present. It
rejected the lower court's distinction that Donohue involved nonfeasance
while Hoffman involved an affirmative act of misfeasance; that is, the
failure to reevaluate Daniel after two years.61 The court stated that "[t]he
policy considerations which promoted our decision in Donohue apply with
equal force to 'educational malpractice' actions based upon allegations of
See generally, Anna Mary Coburn, Hunter v. Board of Education & Doe u.
Board of Education - No Cause of Action for Educational Malpractice Against
Public School Teachers and Psychologists, 42 MD. L. REV. 582 (1983).
s400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979).
56Id.
400 N.E.2d 317, 319 (N.Y. 1979).
"Id.
Id. at 319.
"Id.
61 Id. at 320.
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educational misfeasance and nonfeasance. ' ' 62 The Hoffman court held that
a dispute of this type was best resolved through administrative procedures
because imposing a judicial remedy would interfere with educators'
professional judgment.u
The distinction between educational misfeasance and nonfeasance may
provide a cognizable cause of action in the future. Public policy basis for
rejecting the claims in Peter W. and Donohue do not apply with equal
force to a school's failure to implement its own recommendations. The
school has, in the latter case, defined its professional responsibility,
thereby relieving the courts of undue speculation."
However, even where injury followed acts or omissions, courts have to
date been unwilling to adopt even a limited cause of action for educational
malpractice. In one case, 65 the school district failed to treat or even at-
tempt to correct a diagnosed handicap for two dyslexic students.6 6 The
facts clearly showed that the school district had been negligent. Still, the
plaintiff's claims were denied on public policy grounds.67 The court re-
jected this educational malpractice claim because it felt that excessive
litigation 6l would result and that it would lead to inappropriate judicial
interference in school administration.69 The court added that because
there were administrative remedies available, monetary relief was not
necessary to make the plaintiff "whole." 70
Doe v. Board of Education7l contained equally sympathetic facts and
was similarly rejected by the courts. In Doe, the Board's school psychol-
ogist determined that the child was either retarded or had borderline
intellectual function. A reevaluation was recommended in ten months.
The school district did not reevaluate, and the child continued in the
special education classroom. One year later Doe was evaluated by a pri-
vate physician who determined that Doe was dyslexic, not retarded. Nei-
ther the board nor the health department responded to this information.
In addition, neither the board nor the health department reevaluated Doe
for seven years. The same school psychologist who had originally tested
Doe recommended that he not be removed from the special program for
62 Hoffman v. Bd. of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. 1979).
63 Id.
" If the door to 'educational torts' for nonfeasance is to be opened .... it
will not be by this case which involves misfeasance in failing to follow the
individualized and specific prescription of defendant's own certified psy-
chologist, whose very decision it was in the first place, to place plaintiff in
a class for retarded children, or in the initial making by him of an ambiguous
report, if that be the fact.
Id.
65 D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska
1981).
' RId. at 556.
67 Id. at 555.
- Id.69D.S.W., 628 P.2d.70 Id. at 557.
"1 Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982).
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children with mild learning handicaps. One year later, this psychologist
recommended a complete eye examination for Doe which was also not
implemented.7 2 Doe's suit questioned the performance of the school au-
thorities with the gravamen of the complaint sounding in malpractice
based on the improper treatment of the child. Once again, the court
rejected the malpractice option refusing to substitute its judgment for
that of school administrators.
There have been similar cases where courts in educational negligence
situations have failed to adopt a new public policy posture. One oft-cited
case involved the claim of a non-English speaking Hispanic child who
was incorrectly assessed as borderline, developmentally retarded.7 3 In a
more recent case,74 the school district classified the plaintiff as retarded;
and, discovered three years later that the child was not retarded but
deaf.7 5 The court again dismissed this educational malpractice claim cit-
ing precedent.
III. DUTY OF CARE ARGUMENTS
The law does not, and should not, provide a remedy for every injury.76
For example, the parents of an infant daughter who was born with and
eventually succumbed to Tay-Sachs disease brought an action against a
physician, seeking damages for mental distress. They contended that the
physician should have known the high risk that the fetus would suffer
from the disease. If the parents had been advised that the fetus was
afflicted with Tay-Sachs, they claim they would have aborted the preg-
nancy. In denying recovery to the parents, the court held: "There can be
no doubt that the plaintiffs have suffered and the temptation is great to
offer them some form of relief. Ideally, there should be a remedy for every
wrong. This however, is not the function of the law for "[every] injury
has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end.
The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to
a controllable degree.."7
7
Of the traditional elements necessary for a negligence action,78 "duty
1Id. at 818-19.
1 Torres v. Little Flower Children's Services, 474 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
74 DeRosa v. City of New York, 517 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1987).75 Id. at 755.
16 Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66 (N.Y. 1977).77 Id. at 66 (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969)).
78 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 164-65. The elements of negligence
action are:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform
to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable
risks.
2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: a breach
of the duty ...
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury ...
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
Id. at 165-65.
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of care" is often the most difficult to establish. There are three alternative
theories which are posed as establishing the requisite duty of care.79
"Assumption of duty" is the first theory supporting the existence of a
duty. By affirmatively undertaking to give aid to another, a defendant's
school district could be liable for assuming a duty and subsequently mak-
ing the plaintiffs situation worse, either by increasing the danger, by
misleading the plaintiff into the belief that it has been removed, or by
depriving him of help from other sources. 0 Under this theory, the school
district assumed the function of student instruction, and such an as-
sumption necessarily imposed the duty to exercise reasonable care in its
discharge."' At first glance, any assumption of duty by the school district
would not appear to actually harm a plaintiff, since he or she would enter
the school with no education and leave with some positive degree of
education, albeit minimal. It is arguable however, that the school district
could mislead students into believing that they were receiving an ade-
quate education, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to seek out-
side aid, such as aid from a private school or a tutor.8 2
The second theory deals with the establishment of a legal duty involving
a special relationship between students and teachers. s3 Under a "special
relationship" theory, certain relationships which involve power to one
and a parallel weakness in another party may give rise to a legal duty.84
The argument is that the school district holds a position of power so
superior to the uneducated students, that they are left vulnerable to
unbridled discretionary acts by the school district. 5 This inequality would
" Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854, 857(1976).81 Id. at 858. For a discussion of the assumption of duty theory, see generally
PROSSER & KEETON supra note 7, at 56. See also, Judith H. Berlinerconer, Note,
The ABC's of Duty: Educational Malpractice and the Functionally Illiterate Stu-
dent, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. R. 293 (1978) (arguing that a basis for establishing a
school district's duty may lie in the state's voluntary assumption of the job of
educating children).
8' Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
82 Even if no duty to educate previously existed, the school's voluntary as-
sumption of the function of student instruction would impose the duty to avoid
any affirmative acts which make the student's situation worse. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 7, at 378; Parvi v. City of Kingston, 362 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y.1977) (police disposed of drunkard near highway, instead of jail, thereby making
drunkard's situation worse); O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960)(doctor attempted to give free advice over telephone).
"Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858. The plaintiff in Peter W. cited various cases
which addressed many rights or privileges of public school students, but none
which involved the specific question of whether the school owed them a duty of
care in the process of their education. Id.
' PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 374. During the last century, custom,public sentiment, and views of social policy have led to judicial recognition of an
affirmative duty in a limited group of relationships where no such duty to act
would otherwise be imposed. Id. See David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the
Public Good, 56 S.CAL. L. R. 103, 104 (1982); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO
ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
" Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854, 858 (1976).
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create a special relationship supporting the duty of the school district to
exercise reasonable care in instructing the students.
When arguing educational malpractice, establishing such a duty of care
in the educators under a "special relationship" theory could be defeated
by another "special relationship" between parent and child. Clearly, the
child is not absolutely vulnerable to the educators' actions because of the
parents' contribution to the education process. Parents have opportunities
to supervise homework, to participate in school activities, and to interact
with their children on a daily basis. On the other hand, a lower-income
parent without an education who works two jobs to support a family would
not be able to significantly participate in the student's education. Such
a parent might not recognize any learning deficiencies on the part of the
student, thereby emphasizing the importance of the relationship between
the educator and the student. This example provides a strong argument
for establishing a legal duty of care in the school district based upon a
special relationship.
A third theory was developed by expanding a similar duty previously
recognized by the courts. A legal duty to exercise reasonable care in the
instruction and supervision of students has been recognized in cases in-
volving physical injuries on school grounds.86 The basis of the argument
is that the courts' recognition of a duty to exercise reasonable care in the
instruction and supervision of students includes the duty to exercise rea-
sonable care in providing students with education.
8 7
All three theories have been rejected "for want of relevant authority"'8
and public policy considerations.8 9 These policy considerations include:
(1) foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) closeness of the connection
between defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; and, (3) extent of
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of im-
posing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.90
The primary public concern was the absence of a workable standard of
care against which an educator's conduct could be measured.91 As the
Peter W, court stated: "Unlike the activity of the highway or the mar-
ketplace, classroom methodology affords no readily acceptable standard
of care, or cause, or injury."92 The Montana Supreme Court's analysis in
Klenzendorf v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist., 40 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1935) (injury
in woodshop class causing loss of fingertips); Dutcher v. City of Santa Rosa High
Sch. Dist., 319 P.2d 14 (Cal. 1957) (explosion in auto mechanics class resulting
in death of one student and severe injuries to another); Bellman v. San Francisco
High Sch. Dist., 81 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1938)) (injury from tumbling exercise in physical
education class); Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858; Mastrangelo v. West Side Union
High Sch. Dist., 42 P.2d 634 (Cal. 1935) (explosion in chemistry class resulting
in loss of student's hand and eye); Damgaard v. Oakland High Sch. Dist. of
Alameda County, 298 P. 983 (Cal. 1931) (explosion in chemistry class causing
student to lose eye).
817 Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
8 Id.
19Id. at 859.
0 Id. at 859-60.
91 Peter W, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
Id. at 860-61.
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B.M. v. State provides hope for future victims of negligence in the school
systems: "We have no difficulty in finding a duty of care owed to special
education students."93 Nevertheless, current educational malpractice case
law demonstrates the general fear of court involvement in virtually any
intangible dimension of public education.
IV. ALTERNATE THEORIES OF RECOVERY
As stated previously, courts have almost uniformly rejected educational
malpractice claims. This rejection has provoked an unusually large and
rich discussion from legal scholars regarding the plausibility of educa-
tional malpractice claims under different theories of recovery.9 4 The most
13 B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425, 427 (Mont. 1982), appeal after remand, 698 P.2d
399 (Mont. 1985).
94 See John Elson, A Common Law Remedy For the Educational Harms Caused
by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1978) (reviewing the
general policy considerations underlying the court's reluctance to make decisions
concerning educational policies); Richard Funston, Educational Malpractice: A
Cause of Action in Search of a Theory, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 743 (1981) (arguing
that the existent theories of recovery are logically unsound and inadequate to
support an educational malpractice claim; and even if a legally sufficient justi-
fication for recognizing such a cause of action could be found, compelling consid-
erations of public policy argue against such recognition); Jerry, supra note 1, at
196 (arguing that "refusal to recognize [a] cause of action [for educational mal-
practice] is incompatible with accepted tort principles, and that a cogent theory
supporting nonrecognition cannot be articulated within the confines of the ac-
cepted principles and the general policies upon which those principles are based");
Joan Blackburn, Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117, 118 (1978) (analyzing "the alternative theories which
form a basis of a suit for educational malpractice" and suggesting that an action
for negligent misrepresentation may be the best theory for establishing liability);
Berlinconer, supra note 79 (analyzing various theories upon which to establish
a legal duty of care on the part of the educators and comparing physical injuries
on school grounds to academic injuries received from educational malpractice);
Wallison, supra, note 64 (considers whether Hoffman was incorrectly labeled as
an educational malpractice action, thus significantly expanding the scope of the
term "educational malpractice"); Alice J. Klein, Note, Educational Malpractice:
Can the Judiciary Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 27 (1979) (investigating the feasibility of educational mal-
practice grounded in negligence, focusing on legislative developments regarding
the quality of education and the potential impact of competency tests, educators
may face expansion of liability for physical harm to encompass emotional and
economic injury as well); Nancy L. Woods, Note, Educational Malfeasance: A New
Cause of Action for Failure to Educate?, 14 TULSA L. J. 383 (1978) (considers the
viability of educational malpractice actions in light of malpractice actions for
educational accountability and competency-based education due to the movement
in some states toward educational accountability); Comment, Educational Mal-
practice, 124 U. PA. L. REV, 755, 804 (1976) [hereinafter Comment, U.Pa. L. Rev.]
(reviewing different theories of recovery and arguing that "a negligence suit
stands the most chance of success [with a] comparative [standard of care], that
is, the level of skill and learning of the minimally acceptable teacher in the same
or similar communities"); Charles M. Masner, Note, Educational Malpractice and
a Right to Education: Should Compulsory Education Laws Require a Quid Pro
Quo?, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 555 (1982) (questions whether students may bring an
action for educational malpractice by arguing that compulsory school attendance
requires the state to provide a student and his parents with a quid pro quo in
order to avoid a constitutional violation of substantive due process).
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popular theory of potential recovery is the traditional tort principle of
professional negligence.95 Other theories of recovery include interpreta-
tions of contract law, misrepresentation, and constitutional grounds.
96
A. Contract
The contract theory of recovery includes several different approaches.
One involves an implied contract between the student and the teacher,
or between the student and the school or school district.9 7 The plaintiff
argues that the school promised to teach the student and provide a certain
level of education. 8 In theory, the school's promise could have been either
express, as in a state constitution and statutory provisions for education,
99
or implied from the very circumstances of the education process viz., to
provide an education sufficient to prepare a student for a proper role in
society. In exchange for the promise of an education, the student claims
to have not attempted to seek private school education, or that their public
school attendance creates the necessary consideration. 100 The student then
alleges that the school district failed to fulfill its promise, thus breaching
the implied contract of providing an acceptable minimal level of educa-
tion.
11 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
See Blackburn, supra, note 94 (misrepresentation); Berlinerconer, supra note
80 (contract); Masner, supra note 94 (constitutional grounds).
97 See Comment, U. PA. L. REV., supra note 94 at 784-89; Masner, supra note
94, at 563-64. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a (1981):
Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied. The distinction involves,
however, no difference in legal effect, but lies merely in the mode of man-
ifesting assent. Just as assent may be manifested by words or other conduct,
sometimes including silence, so intention to make a promise may be man-
ifested in language or by implication from other circumstances, including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.
Id.
98 See Jerry, supra note 2, at 195.
" See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST.
art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. 8, § 4; DEL. CONsT. art. X, § I; GA. CONST. art. 8,
§ 1; IDAHO CONsT. art. 9, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1; Ky.
CONST. § 183; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, art. II; MICH.
CONST. art. VIII, § 2, (amended 1970); MINN. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1; Mo. CONST.
art. IX, § 1(a); NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art.
XI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEx. CONsT. art. VII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
100 "Consideration" is defined as: "The inducement to a contract. The cause,
motive, price, or impelling influence which induces a contracting party to enter
into a contract. Some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or
some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken
by the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 277 (5th ed. 1979).
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One difficulty in using the contract theory of recovery is in establishing
consideration or "a bargained-for-exchange."10 Because public education
is provided free of cost, students themselves do not directly pay money
in exchange for receiving public education.0 2 Secondly, in that school
attendance is compulsory until a certain age, school attendance alone
would not suffice as the necessary consideration. If students could actually
establish consideration through forbearance from seeking an education
elsewhere, this would preclude students from lower-income households
from raising a contract claim. Thus, the contract theory of recovery would
be available only to students from families wealthy enough to afford
private education. 10 3
An alternate contract-based approach is to consider the student as a
third-party beneficiary of an employment contract between the teacher
and the school district. 0 4 The student would have to demonstrate an
"intent to benefit" a third party in order to enforce the contract.'0 5 There
is some rationale for this position because the employment of teachers
and the appropriation of taxpayers' money concerns the benefit to students
in receiving a certain level of education.
Yet, should third-party beneficiary status be established, there would
still be significant recovery concerns. An individual teacher or employee's
liability would be based upon a breach of contract, not upon a tortious
act. Thus, under contract law a school district would not be vicariously
liable.'0 6 Additionally, whether a promisor should be liable to a third-
party beneficiary is usually a public policy consideration. Based on a
public policy analysis, the courts have generally rejected such educational
malpractice claims.10 7 When the recovery is based on the law of contracts,
the courts have traditionally been less flexible than when claims are
brought under traditional tort theory.108
101 "To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be
bargained for." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). "In the typical
bargain, the consideration and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of motive
or inducement; the consideration induces the making of the promise and the
promise induces the furnishing of the consideration." Id. at § 71, cmt. b.
102 Of course, taxpayers pay money to support the school systems.
103 See Blackburn, supra note 94, at 185.
'- See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981):(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary
of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to perfor-
mance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the
parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obli-
gation of the promise to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circum-
stances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit
of the promised performance.
Id. at § 302.
105 See Comment, U. PA. L. REV., supra note 94, at 786. See also J. CALAMARI
& J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17-2, at 693 (rd. Ed. 1977).
,o6 See supra, notes 8-18.
107 See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,588,364 P.2d 685,687, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 987 (1962).
108 See Funston, supra note 93, at 763; Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1974).
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B. Misrepresentation
A second theory of recovery for educational malpractice is misrepre-
sentation. The misrepresentation theory has already been addressed and
dismissed by the courts. In Peter W.109 the plaintiff alleged both inten-
tional and negligent misrepresentation."" The court dismissed the neg-
ligent misrepresentation claim on the same public policy grounds that
justified the dismissal of the plaintiff's negligence claim.' The inten-
tional misrepresentation contention was dismissed because the plaintiff
failed to include in the pleading any allegation of the "reliance" necessary
to support the claim. 1 2 The court did not indicate whether intentional
misrepresentation might have been considered if reliance had been prop-
erly pleaded. Therefore, it is possible that a properly pleaded complaint
might have been successful.
It should be noted that an action for intentional misrepresentation,
unlike negligent misrepresentation, requires the specific intent to induce
reliance on the false or misleading representation." 3 Therefore, a teach-
er's statement to the student and/or parents, (e.g., through report cards)
might be considered an actual misrepresentation in an educational mal-
practice case." 4 A plaintiff would still bear the heavy burden of estab-
lishing the teacher's intent to deceive. 15 A teacher's honest belief that a
representation is true, no matter how unreasonable, will defeat an in-
tentional misrepresentation action. 1 6 It would be a difficult obstacle to
establish proof of an intent to deceive in an intentional misrepresentation
complaint.
1 7
109 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
"10 Defendant school district, its agents and employees, false and fraudulently
represented to plaintiff's mother and natural guardian that plaintiff was per-
forming at or near grade level in basic academic skills such as reading and writing.
." Id. at 862. Either the defendants knew that the representations were false,
or they had no basis for believing them to be true. "As a direct and proximate
result of the intentional or negligent misrepresentation made ... plaintiff suf-
fered the damages set forth herein." Id.
"I Id. at 862.
"2 Peter W, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at
749.
"I Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
114 Misrepresentation is defined as follow: "Any manifestation by words or other
conduct by one person to another that, under the circumstances, amounts to an
assertion not in accordance with the facts. An untrue statement of fact." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 903 (5th ed. 1979). In Peter W., the plaintiff not only received
satisfactory report cards, but also a high school diploma representing completion
of the 12th grade. Even though Peter W. could only read and write at the fifth
grade level. Thus, the report cards and diploma served as evidence of the alleged
misrepresentation. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
15 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 741-45. The most important intent
in intentional misrepresentation actions is the intent to deceive, mislead, or
convey a false impression. Id. at 741.
116 Id. at 742.
17 Of course, proof of an intent to deceive on the part of the educator does not
necessarily pose an insurmountable burden. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 526 (1976) provides:
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker
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Even if an intent to deceive is evident, students must demonstrate that
they justifiably relied on the educator's false representations." 8 A mis-
representation action is similar to a contract-based claim in requiring
proof of reliance. The plaintiff must prove that had it not been for the
misrepresentation, they would have been sent to a private school or pro-
vided private tutoring." 9 Additionally, the justifiability of that reliance
may be impossible to establish considering a parent's limited opportunity
to view and assess their children's educational development. 2 0
Unlike intentional misrepresentation an action for negligent misre-
presentation could go forward even if the representation was made with
an honest belief. Liability for negligent misrepresentation is based upon
the defendant's negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care and com-
petence in supplying correct information for the guidance of others.' 21 A
negligent misrepresentation theory of recovery would be based on the use
of report cards, intelligence quotient tests, diplomas, or statements neg-
ligently provided by the school.
Various problems underlie the negligent misrepresentation theory of
recovery. Again, the plaintiff must establish justifiable reliance on the
negligent misrepresentation.122 Even if these obstacles can be overcome,
a court could still simply dismiss this educational malpractice complaint
based on the same policy considerations which apply to ordinary negli-
gence theories. 123
C. Constitutional Right
Although free public education is provided under state constitutions,124
the right to receive an education is not explicitly afforded protection under
the United States Constitution. 25 In Brown v. Board of Education,'126 the
Supreme Court stated that "education is perhaps the most important
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be,(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that
he states or implies, or(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he
states or implies.
118 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 749. "Not only must there
be reliance but the reliance must be justifiable under the circumstances."
Id.
"i See Blackburn, supra note 94.20Id., at 133. If for example, a parent witnessed a child's inability to read and
write, the justifiability of the reliance could be defeated.
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 552 comment a (1976).
12 For discussion of justifiable reliance, see cases cited supra note 8. Again,
this would have the anomalous effect of precluding lower-income class plaintiffs
from raising the negligent misrepresentation claim.
12I The Peter W. court dismissed the negligent misrepresentation allegation for
the same public policy considerations utilized in dismissing the negligence cause
of action, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (1976).
124 See supra note 100.
125 San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
126 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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function of state and local governments.' ' 27 The Court however, later
recognized that education is not a fundamental right guaranteed protec-
tion under the Constitution.
128
Despite the absence of a federal constitutional right to an education,
an alternative constitutional approach for educational malpractice claims
involves a substantive due process argument. Here the plaintiff alleges
that the state must provide a quid pro quo129 in return for the deprivation
of his or her constitutional liberty interest.' 30 Using this argument, stu-
dents attending schools under compulsory attendance laws are compa-
rable to involuntarily confined mental institution patients.'' In
127 347 U.S. at 493.
128 411 U.S. 1. Rodriguez was a class action suit brought on behalf of students
enrolled in the Texas public schools. Being members of minority groups residing
in school districts having a low property tax base, plaintiffs argued that the Texas
system of financing public education, funded through local property taxation,
discriminated against students from poor schools districts. Based on this discrim-
ination, the plaintiffs claimed that the state had a duty to ensure the equal
protection of their fundamental right to obtain an education.
The plaintiff's were denied. No fundamental right was abridged where only
relative differences in spending levels were involved and where "no charge fairly
could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of
speech and of full participation in the political process." Id. at 37. Rodriquez may,
therefore, be construed as holding that the quality of education need not be
absolutely equal.
12 "What for what; something for something. Used in law for the giving one
valuable thing for another. It is nothing more than the mutual consideration
which passes between the parties to a contract, and which renders it valid and
binding." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (5th ed. 1979).
130 Masner, supra note 94, at 568. See also Patricia Wright Morrison, Note, The
Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 796, 810 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized fourteenth amendment con-
stitutionally-protected liberty interests in students and parents. In Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), the Court stated:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of
the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness among free men.
Id.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court recognized the
"liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren under their control." Id. at 534-35. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), the Court recognized that
students have independent constitutionally protected rights.
It would seem that because the Supreme Court has recognized these liberty
interests, a student or parent may be able to raise a substantive due process
argument in an educational malpractice action.
131 See Masner, supra note 94, at 568.
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Donaldson v. O'Connor,'3' the Fifth Circuit held that where an involun-
tarily confined mental patient was confined under the theory of parens
patriae,3 3 due process required that minimally adequate treatment be
provided.134 Furthermore, the Donaldson court held that if the confine-
ment occurred under the state's police power,' 35 due process required the
state to provide a quid pro quo unless the conventional procedural safe-
guards of the criminal process were applied.
136
The lower court's reasoning in Donaldson has been advanced as a po-
tential theory of recovery in educational malpractice claims.' 37 Under this
theory of recovery, the plaintiff-students argue that the school violated
their substantive due process rights to receive a minimally adequate
education, i.e., quid pro quo in return for their compulsory attendance at
school.138
Without question, this theory contains serious flaws. In Youngberg v.
Romeo,'139 the Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, considered the
substantive due process rights of involuntarily committed mental pa-
tients. The issue involved is whether the patients had the constitutional
right to safe conditions of confinement, minimally adequate habilitation
and freedom from bodily restraint.' 40 The Court held that safe conditions
of confinement and freedom from bodily restraint were protected liberty
interests, but that the claim of a right to a minimally adequate habili-
tation was "more troubling.' 141 The Court stressed the importance of de-
132 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
133 Parens patriae "refers traditionally to the role of state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th
ed. 1979). Using a parens patriae rationale for confinement, the individual con-
fined is in need of care or treatment, and may be dangerous to himself, but he
does not present a danger to others. See Masner, supra note 94, at 572.
'3,Donaldson, 493 F.2d at 521.
135 "Police Power" is:
[tihe power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and
property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and
morals or the promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity.
The police power is subject to limitations of the federal and state consti-
tutions, and especially to the requirement of due process. Police power is
the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety,
health, morals, and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an
essential attribute of government.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
Under the police power rationale for confinement, the patient is dangerous to
himself as well as others. Masner, supra note 94, at 572.
136 Donaldson, 493 F.2d at 522.
13 See Masner, supra note 94; A. MoRRs, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
EDUCATION 128-31 (2d ed. 1980).
131 Masner, supra note 94 at 568.
139 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
14 Id. at 309-10. The case involved a profoundly retarded 33-year-old individual
who was involuntarily committed to a Pennsylvania state institution. The case
was filed following reports of injuries suffered by the patients, including Romeo's
son.
141 Id. at 2458.
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ference to the judgment of a professional, commenting that judges andjuries are considerably less capable of evaluating what is "minimally
adequate training."'142
In light of the Youngberg holding, it appears that federal constitutional
grounds in an education malpractice complaint are unlikely to succeed.
In fact, no student has successfully alleged that a school totally failed to
provide an education. School-based claims are necessarily weaker than
those in Youngberg since students, unlike mental patients, are not in-
voluntarily confined on a 24-hour-per-day basis. The Court's deference to
the judgment of professionals in assessing the scope of "minimally ade-
quate training" would likely extend to the professional judgment of teach-
ers in defining minimally adequate education. A constitutionally-based
theory of recovery would therefore probably not provide recovery for ed-
ucational malpractice.
V. COMPARATIVE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
EDUCATION MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
A. Policy Considerations for Failure to
Provide Basic Educational Skills
In rejecting educational malpractice as a cause of action, courts have
adopted the position that public policy considerations outweigh the tra-
ditional negligence analysis which would allow a student-plaintiffs in-juries to trigger an action for damages. Recognizing the tort of educational
malpractice would impose a legal responsibility on educators for the
growth and development of an individual student.
The traditional negligence claim requires the plaintiff to prove that a
legal duty of care was owed to him/her, and that a breach of duty actually
or proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. 1 3 It is a question of law as
to whether there is, in fact, a recognized duty.14
By not imposing a legal duty on educators to guarantee that students
acquire basic academic skills, the courts are taking the position that
public policy dictates that no legal obligation should be recognized. This
skirts the essential question: whether a plaintiffs interests are entitled
142 Id. at 2462. The Court added the following:
we agree that respondent is entitled to minimally adequate training. In
this case, the minimally adequate training required by the Constitution is
such training as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraints. In determining what is "rea-
sonable" - in this and any case presenting a claim for training by the State
- we emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised
by a qualified professional.
Id. at 2461.
S43See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 164-65.
'" Id. at 236.
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to legal protection against the defendant's conduct. It should come as no
surprise that the problem of duty is as broad as the very law of negligence
and no universal duty test has been formulated. Regardless, a duty anal-
ysis is firmly embedded in the law and will remain, if for no other reason
than because there is no satisfactory substitute designed to limit a de-
fendant's responsibility. "Duty" itself is not sacrosanct, but merely an
expression of the sum total of policy considerations which causes the law
to protect a plaintiff.
45
1. Duty Cannot Be Established Without A Standard of Care.
The courts have found no standard of care for the general education of
students which creates a legally-recognized duty. The belief that teaching
children does not allow for a standard of care which the court could
recognize was the very basis for the court decisions in Peter W. and Do-
nohue.14 6 Courts have been unable to define the overriding standards
which guide education. 147 As one court stated, "[cllassroom methodology
does not provide readily acceptable standards of care, or causation, or
even injury. The pedagogical field is overrun with different and conflicting
theories of how or what a child should be taught. . .. "148
Operative educational policies are not formulated at a national level,
but rather at the local district level, and thus adds to the lack of profes-
sional consensus in determining a standard of care. 149 Establishing class-
room teaching objectives has been left to school building administrators
while goals are set by state and local school boards that adopt policy
statements that teachers must follow. Local districts, and not individual
teachers, develop policies which control teaching methodology, instruc-
tion and supervision as well as determining pupil development. Teachers
not only lack control of their own profession, but there is also a vast
divergence of opinion as to what is a correct and proper educational
practice. As long as educators are unable to agree on what ordinary care
and skill is required in a specific situation, courts will not support edu-
cational malpractice. It would be almost ridiculous to establish a legal
standard when teachers themselves cannot agree on what ordinary care
and experience would be in a given situation. Thus, courts are rightfully
hesitant to make a determination as to "what is customary and usual in
a profession."'150
',5 Id. at 357-58.
'"Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
147 See, e.g., Patrick D. Lynch, Education Policy and Educational Malpractice
in CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION 212-13 (M. McGhehey ed. 1979).
"I Peter W., at 860-61.
149 Lynch, supra note 147, at 232.
"' PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 189.
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2. Courts Do Not Wish To Interfere With
Educational Policy Making.
In order to prevent excessive intrusion into the educational process,
courts have also been hesitant to judicially determine specific educational
standards. 5 1 Courts have great difficulty determining what is the proper
exercise of professional judgment and what is a negligent educational act
because educational policies have historically been developed locally. 15 2
Consider how difficult it would be for a court to establish the appropriate
standard of care in a situation where teachers exercise personal judgment
in choosing between the differing instructional methodologies and injury
results. Such judicial speculation is carefully avoided because it poses the
realistic threat of excessive interference with school policy formation.
Courts are justifiably hesitant to "guess" the appropriate standard of care
because this would be to place the court directly into the educational
process.
3. Proximate Cause Is Difficult To Establish.
The basic reason that courts have refused to recognize an educational
negligence tort is that it is difficult for the plaintiff to establish the school
system as the sole or proximate cause of the injury. For example, the
"injury" in Peter W. was the general inability to read and write. Not-
withstanding this proven inability to read and write, a large body of
educational and psychological authority holds that school failure and
illiteracy are controlled by varied factors impacting each child differently.
Often these factors are outside of the formal educational sphere. These
difficulties ". .. may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, en-
vironmental; they may be present but not perceived, recognized but not
identified."'153 The Donohue court clearly addressed this proximate cause
problem holding that as a question of policy, educational malpractice
should not be accepted as a legally recognized cause of action.5 4
Of course, plaintiffs regularly experience difficulty in establishing prox-
imate cause in negligence cases. While it is more difficult to prove that
1' Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979);
Hoffman v. Board of Educ. 400 N.E.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. 1979).52 Torrence P. Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doctrine to the Teaching
Profession, 11 J.L. & ECON. 479, 495-96 (1982).
1,1 Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
154 The practical problems raised by a cause of action sounding in educational
malpractice are so formidable that I would conclude that such a legal theory
should not be cognizable in our courts. These problems ... include thepractical impossibility of proving that the alleged malpractice of the teacher
proximately caused the learning deficiency of the plaintiff student. Factors
such as the student's attitude, motivation, temperament, past experience
and home environment may all play an essential and immeasurable role
in learning.
Donohue, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1358, (N.Y. 1979).
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educators proximately caused the educational deficiencies, it could be
argued that this proximate cause difficulty is not one which should pre-
clude the recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice. In
such a scenario, establishing cause would merely be another bridge which
a plaintiff had to cross to establish prima facia negligence. 15 5 Because
causation is a proof problem, a plaintiff will lose the suit if this proof test
is not met.
4. Administrative Remedies Are Available To Correct Inequities.
A key reason which courts have given for not recognizing the tort of
educational malpractice is that there are administrative remedies within
the school system for aggrieved parties. 56 This argument is grounded on
the judicial belief that educational malpractice torts would involve the
court in educational policy making. By deferring to the school system's
administrative remedies, the courts allow schools to establish their own
policies and to develop intra-system remedies.
5. Excessive Costs For The School System.
In Donohue, the court indicated that one reason for denying educational
malpractice as a generalized cause of action is because of the fear of a
"flood" of litigation. 5 7 School systems have been easy targets for various
claims including failure to maintain equipment and negligent supervi-
sion, because school systems have lost much of their sovereign immu-
nity.15 The court's current position indicates the policy that to add an
educational malpractice cause of action based on general education failure
is unacceptable.
B. Policy Considerations in the Special Education Area
It is in the area of special education where the legal remedy of edu-
cational malpractice, although possibly not denominated as such, may
eventually be recognized. Revolving around the concept of duty5 9 is the
judicial prerogative to evaluate policy issues in making a determination
as to whether to allow a cause of action. Courts have held that there are
"5 Collingsworth, supra note 152, at 498-99.
156 Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1355 (N.Y. 1979); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400
N.E.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. 1979).
15 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
158 Most states have legislatively or judicially abrogated the defense of sover-
eign immunity. EUGENE T. CONNORS, EDUCATIONAL TORT LIABILITYAND MAL-
PRACTICE 13 (1981).
'" PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 357-58.
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valid policy reasons for rejecting all educational malpractice claims;160
however, if a cause of action is delimited to include only misclassification
or misplacement of children in special education situations, these policy
concerns are far less persuasive. The following are the same policy reasons
discussed regarding general education as applied to a special education
complaint. Each policy reason will now be considered in light of a limited
cause of action for negligence in classification, diagnosis and placement
in special education classes.
1. A Duty to Educationally Handicapped Students.
While state constitutional and statutory educational provisions do not
explicitly provide for common law damage relief for educational mal-
practice, these provisions could be used as a basis to establish an edu-
cational duty. 161 This is possible even though state educational provisions
are usually not enacted to confer a benefit on an individual student but
to support and maintain the public school system. These state provisions
relating to education are "not of a type normally thought to create a tort
duty. They are not intended to protect individual children against the
injury of an education but are instead designed to promote the general
welfare through the development of a literate and productive popula-
tion".162
Federal legislation provides a specific duty to a handicapped student
through Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA).163 While subject to
debate,'6 it would appear that courts can apply minimal standards for
implementing procedures in the special education area. The EHA pro-
vides federal funding to encourage the establishment of state and local
special education programs and services. With participation in this fed-
eral support program, a duty is imposed on the state or local entity to
identify, locate, and evaluate those children in need of services.1 65 The
goal of state or local EHA programs is to assure all handicapped
160 Hoffman v. Bd. of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979).
"I See B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425, 427 (Mont. 1982) (Recognized an educational
malpractice cause of action, based on the educational provisions of the state
constitution, the compulsory attendance law, and legislation governing the ad-
ministration of special education programs).
162 Funston, supra note 94, at 776-77.
163 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1462 (1988).
- See generally Remz, Legal Remedies for the Misclassification or Wrongful
Placement of Educationally Handicapped Children, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
389 (1979) (arguing that the Education of the Handicapped Act supports a cause
of action for special education malpractice). But see Halligan, The Function of
Schools, the Status of Teachers, and the Claims of the Handicapped: An Inquiry
into Special Education Malpractice, 45 Mo. L. REV. 667 (1980) (arguing against
any private cause of action premised on the Education of the Handicapped Act).1- 20 U.S.C § 1402(2)(C)(1988).
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children 16 6 the right to a free appropriate public education. The term
"appropriate" does not require instruction which maximizes individual
performance.' 6 7 Instead, the term "appropriate" refers to a specially de-
signed instruction which results in an educational benefit to the handi-
capped child.
A free appropriate education under the Act must be implemented "in
conformity with the individualized educational program" (IEP).168 An IEP
is a document prepared by various school representatives who are qual-
ified to design programs for handicapped children. 169 The IEP is prepared
in cooperation with the parent and includes, but is not limited, to the
following: (1) educational performance status; (2) annual educational
goals; (3) instructional objectives; (4) appropriate objective criteria and
evaluation procedures; (5) present educational services being provided;
and, (6) an annual review schedule to determine whether the agreed upon
objectives are being met.'7 0 All states are presently implementing a pro-
gram funded through EHA.'
17
Recent Supreme Court decisions reinforce the position that the EHA
not only provides for funding but also includes procedural guidelines.'
7 2
The EHA therefore confers procedural due process rights to handicapped
students in public education. Participating states receive federal financial
assistance upon the state's conformance to EHA. States seeking to qualify
for federal handicapped funding must develop policies assuring all dis-
abled children the "right to a free appropriate public education." The
primary vehicle for implementing these congressional goals is the "in-
dividualized educational program" mandated for each disabled child.' 73
EHA also includes administrative review procedures' 7 4 as well as a special
166Id. § 1412(1). The EHA defines "handicapped children" as "mentally re-
tarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously
emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired chil-
dren, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require
special education and related services." Id. at 1401(1).
16,7 Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). See generally Gail S.
Fleig & Daniel J. Reschly, Special Education and the Law, in EDUCATORS, CHIL-
DREN AND THE LAW 105 (1985).
168 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1988).
169 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1988).
170 Id.
171 PHILLIP R. JONES, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW
30-31 (1981).
172 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). In Honig, school administrators unsuc-
cessfully attempted to circumvent the "stay-put" provision of the EHA, 20 U.S.C.
1415(e)(3) (1988), wherein students must remain in their current educational
placement during administrative proceedings, by indefinitely expelling two emo-
tionally disturbed children. Honig, 484 U.S. at 313.
'
73 Id. at 310-11.
'14 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988).
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review of administrative actions.'75 When all administrative remedies
are exhausted regarding a misdiagnosis or misplacement, the best avenue
for relief may be a state law damage action. At present, this may be the
only effective way for special education children to secure relief for an
injury.
2. Judicial Interference with School Administrative Policies
The earlier discussion indicated that educational malpractice claims
for general negligence actions would not be supported. Applying a medical
or legal malpractice analogy to education is not effective. Unlike law and
medicine, education does not have generally accepted professional stand-
ards. 17 6 In contrast, the likelihood of a judicially-imposed remedy in the
malpractice area is possible in special education misplacement and mis-
diagnosis situations. In these situations, the court can apply available
standards rather than creating standards which might interfere.177 There
has been little or no difficulty in judicial recognition of duties for other
professionals when those whom they serve are injured. Courts have done
this even though they lack personal expertise as to the standards in those
professions. Thus, while lacking expertise in medicine, courts have al-
lowed medical malpractice claims to go forward. Expert testimony must
be used to determine whether a professional has breached the applicable
standard of care.178 A similar use of experts would be appropriate in a
special education malpractice action because the duties and responsibil-
ities are more clearly delineated than are those of education in general.
In the special education area, the focus would be on the individual
student so that the courts can more easily derive a standard of care
regarding negligent treatment. Unlike the teaching of basic academic
skills, special educators have generally accepted standards regarding a
child's classification and placement for special education purposes. A ju-
dicial review of those placement procedures could be structured to avoid
judicial interference in educational policies.179 While educators sometimes
75 Id.
176 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
"I See generally Remz, supra note 163 (suggesting a common law remedy for
negligent diagnosis, classification, or placement of children in the special edu-
cation setting).
178 Courts have always recognized that the practice of a profession involves
intangibles and many unknown quantities. The existence of uncertainties
in the practice of medicine has received specific recognition in the judicial
doctrine that the degree of skill and the standard care required of a physician
may be evaluated only by others in the profession.
Case Comment, Educational Negligence: A Student's Cause of Action for Incom-
petent Academic Instruction, 58 N.C.L. REV. 561, 590 n.158 (1980).
7I See generally Remz, supra note 164 (suggesting a common law remedy for
negligent diagnosis, classification, or placement of children in the special edu-
cation setting).
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disagree over specific special education classifications, customary practice
and consensus can serve as a basis for establishing minimum standards.
The courts could apply these "developed" standards without establishing
educational policy by merely insuring that educators properly implement
standards established in the IEP. This would hold educators to minimum
acceptable and self-imposed standards in student classification and place-
ment. There would be minimal interference because the judiciary would
utilize standards developed by educators to determine acceptable behav-
ior. The result would be a limited tort which imposed liability on educators
when they negligently implement their own policy.
A situation of this kind occurred in Hoffman. The school district's li-
ability was held to be based on the district's failure to implement its
policy of retesting after two years. The failure to retest the child was not
a professional judgment problem, but rather a failure to implement the
school's stated policy.
This analogy to "self-imposed standards" applies in other malpractice
contexts as well. For example, in a legal malpractice action a Code vio-
lation may not give rise to a malpractice action, but the self-imposed
standards related to the lawyer's professional code of conduct "may be a
relevant consideration in a tort action."18 0 Similarly, self imposed stand-
ards can be used to delimit an educational malpractice cause of action.',
3. Establishment of Cause
Generally, a school district's exposure to liability will be limited if a
cause cannot be identified or if other causes are not ruled out. 8 2 Proof of
causation will be easier to establish for plaintiffs alleging misdiagnosis,
misclassification, and misplacement in special education programs than
for plaintiffs alleging general negligent instruction. With special edu-
cation, outside environmental factors are not as heavily implicated. For
example, if an educator misdiagnoses, seriously misclassifies or incor-
rectly places the child in a highly restrictive and educational environ-
ment, cause can be proximately linked to the educational failure. The
self-imposed procedures in the special education arena make it far easier
to trace the specific action or inaction that led to the injury than in a
general academic skills context.
180 Dennis Horan & George Spellmire, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: PREVENTION
AND DEFENSE at 135 (1985).I'l See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554
(Alaska 1981) (holding a school district not liable upon discovering plaintiffs'
dyslexia but began treatment then terminated treatment even though students
dyslexia had not been resolved); Doe v. Board of Educ., 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982)
(finding a school system failed to adopt its own psychologist's recommendation
that child be reevaluated was not actionable negligence); DeRosa v. New York,
517 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1987) (finding no cause of action where school district failed
to re-test child, who was not mentally retarded but only hard of hearing after
having placed the child for three years in a class for mentally retarded children).
182 See Collingsworth, supra note 152.
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4. Administrative Remedies
The EHA and various state special education programs contain com-
prehensive administrative procedures. The EHA provides for a due proc-
ess hearing and notice requirements to insure that parents can seek
special education or challenge placement decisions. 183 Should a parent
challenge a school district's decision, EHA provides an impartial due
process hearing.8 4 This local hearing can be appealed to the state edu-
cational agency, 185 and can be appealed in a civil action in a state or U.S.
district court.'
A plaintiff may not raise an educational negligence action prior to
exhausting administrative remedies. If administrative remedies are not
exhausted, a legal defense is created. This has the effect of both reducing
liability exposure as well as reducing excessive judicial interference. The
process allows the school system an opportunity to solve the problem
which further reduces judicial involvement. The extensiveness of the
EHA provisions and administrative procedures would assure that an ed-
ucational malpractice action supplementing these procedures would not
result in excessive judicial activism and educational policy development.
5. Financial Burden on the School System
With education being considered a public rather than an individual
benefit, 17 the judiciary has resisted transferring funds which are dedi-
cated to the education of children to individual students through litiga-
tion. Although it is entirely possible that the recognition of general
education negligence suits would result in increased litigation, this po-
tentially burdensome volume of litigation would be significantly reduced
if only special education claims were allowed.
Whether educational malpractice claims will prove to be excessive and
burdensome is more properly a legislative rather than a judicial concern.
State legislatures can impose specific sovereign immunity to government
entities. For example, even where sovereign immunity has been abro-
gated then restored, litigation against educators regarding physical su-
pervision, proper instruction in high risk classes (e.g., physical education,
shop, and science) and maintenance of equipment has continued.
'M 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988).
'MId. § 1415 (b)(2).
185 Id.
' Id. § 1415(e)(2).
7 State constitutional and statutory provisions guaranteeing public education
were originally intended to benefit the general public. Funston, supra note 94,
at 777 (1981) ("[T]he purpose of the free public school movement was to confer
the benefit of education upon the general populace."); see also Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free School Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 880 (1978) (State constitutional pro-
vision and legislation that created and maintained the free public school system
were not intended to protect individuals against the "injury" of ignorance.).
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It does not seem appropriate for the judiciary to bar causes of action
that a legislature chose to allow by waiving sovereign immunity."' Courts
have respected legislative decisions abolishing sovereign immunity in
other areas. In Snow v. State, (after the court decided the claim was
medical not educational malpractice) the state-funded nature of the in-
stitution was irrelevant because the legislature had waived sovereign
immunity.189 Furthermore, state legislatures have affirmatively barred
educational negligence in other areas.8 0 If exposure is so burdensome
with limited educational malpractice, state legislatures could reinstitute
an immunity for public schools. In reality, this approach is more appro-
priate because the barring of a negligence action should rest with the
legislature, not the court.
VI. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
A. Action in One Jurisdiction
Only one jurisdiction, Montana, has allowed relief for educational mal-
practice. This state court imposed liability for educational malpractice in
a Hoffman-like fact situation in B.M. v. State.191 When the plaintiff-child
exhibited learning difficulties upon entering school, the school system
had an area psychologist test the child to determine if there was a learning
disability. The psychologist recommended participation in special edu-
cation or repeating kindergarten, and school officials decided on special
education services. At first, this program included a teaching team to
assist students within their regular first grade class. Then, without con-
tacting the families, the special education services were segregated by
moving the students into their own classroom.192
The court held for the plaintiffs, reasoning that there was no clear
statutory immunity which would bar state liability for negligent admin-
istration of a special education program. It held that it was proper and
necessary to allow an educational negligence action to go to trial. As the
basis for its decision, the court believed that a duty of care existed toward
the child because of the defendant's initial testing and placement in a
special education setting. 93 Not surprisingly, the court side-stepped the
Il Collingsworth, supra note 152, at 503 ("If the state treasury can endure
these types there is no reason to discriminate solely against educational mal-
practice suits.").
189 Snow v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1983), af/'d 485 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1984).
190 See Helm v. Professional Children's School, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1980); Pa-
ladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1982).
191 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
192 Id. at 426-27.
1'9 Id. at 427.
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questions as to the appropriateness of the traditional negligence elements
of breach, proximate cause, and injury by indicating that these were fact
questions which would be determined at trial. 194 Thus, the actual merits
of the case were not considered. The existence of duty was grounded on
Montana constitutional provisions requiring (1) education of all citizens;
(2) a mandatory attendance statute to implement this guarantee; and,
(3) numerous administrative statutes outlining special education admin-
istrative program procedures. 95
This one court has taken the liberal position of holding that these
statutes justified a recognition of a duty toward individual students.9 6
The opinion clearly distinguished its case from the Peter W, and the
Donohue genre. Those cases involved "negligent failure to adequately
educate a child in basic academic skills." B.M. v. State involved the second
classification, "negligent misclassification of a student as mentally re-
tarded and subject to special education and negligent misplacement in a
segregated classroom. 197
B. Parallels From Outside of Education
Regardless of foreclosure of educational malpractice claims, this cause
of action may not be completely dead. If the plaintiff claims are denom-
inated differently, they would have some possibility of success. Court
activism in fields related to education may eventually be adopted in ed-
ucation law. For example, in Snow v. State 98 where the fact pattern
paralleled Hoffman, the plaintiff successfully argued a medical rather
than educational malpractice action. Therefore, some plaintiffs injured
in the educational arena may succeed if they argue their cause of action
as medical, not educational, malpractice.
There is further support for this argument. In a memorandum opinion,
one court accepted this alternate approach.'8 9 The defendants filed a mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because an educational mal-
practice claim was barred by public policy. In refusing to grant the motion,
the court ruled that the complaint, which alleged (1) that the school
conducted psychological evaluations of the child; (2) that these evalua-
tions revealed severe psychological problems; and, (3) that the school
failed or refused to notify the mother, did not allege improper education.
The plaintiff was barred from applying an educational malpractice anal-
ysis because improper education was not alleged. If the plaintiff however,
had specifically charged improper education, the implication was that
this court would have accepted the educational malpractice claim.200
194 Id. at 427-28.
115 B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d at 427 (Mont. 1982).
1Id.
197 Id. at 428 (concurring opinion).
"' 469 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1983), aff'd, 485 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1984).
"'Savino v. Board of Educ., 506 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1986) (mem.).
"Id.
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The main distinction between Snow and Hoffman is that the Snow
plaintiff was in a state school which operated similarly to a hospital in
providing continuous medical and psychological treatment. 20 1 The plain-
tiff-child was three years old when first confined to Willowbrook State
School where he remained from 1965 through 1972. He was then confined
to another state school from 1972 through 1974. Upon arrival, the school
failed to determine that the child was deaf. School officials enlarged their
error by postponing the reevaluation of his intelligence. At the same time,
his educational record included selected statements that the child was
bright, expressly contradicting his low IQ score.
It is important to note that the trial court addressed the issue of whether
the allegation was one of educational malpractice or medical malpractice.
The defendant's position in Snow was not supported. In Snow, the de-
fendant alleged that this specific situation sounded in educational mal-
practice, and therefore should be dismissed. The court held that the failure
to reassess the plaintiffs IQ when they had knowledge of his deafness
"constituted a discernible act of medical malpractice on the part of the
state rather than a mere error in judgment vis-a-vis claimant's educa-
tional progress. ' 20 2 Courts have continued to refuse to accept an educa-
tional malpractice cause of action unless presented as an alternative cause
of action such as medical malpractice.
Alternate approaches have been taken in order to circumvent judicial
resistance to educational malpractice claims. While not identifying their
causes of action as "educational malpractice", plaintiffs have pursued
various alternate guises: (1) false imprisonment; (2) negligent treatment;
and, (3) violations of civil and constitutional rights as well as guaranteed
equal protection and due process rights. 0 3 To date these efforts to cir-
cumvent an educational malpractice analysis have not been successful.
The courts have consistently ruled that such complaints were educational
malpractice allegations irrespective of the terminology used in the com-
plaint.
VII. EDUCATION Is NOT A PROFESSION
Traditionally, professionals have special training, are certified by the
state, and hold themselves out as possessing superior skill, training and
knowledge not possessed by ordinary members of the community.20 4 The
question of whether teaching is to be considered a profession is far more
than an idle question. Establishing the status of education as a profession
would help the court to determine the appropriate standard of care to
apply in negligence situations.
201 Snow v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959, 960-61 (1983), affd, 485 N.Y.S.2d 987
(1984).
2 Id. at 964.
213 See Tubell v. Dade County Pub. Sch., 419 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 453 A.2d 14 (Md. 1982).
2" Hunter v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582, 589 (Md. 1982).
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Among the arguments against education being a profession is that
education:
... is not a learned profession. It is governed by hierarchical
bureaucracies and not by the profession itself. It is a role in
which the discretion of individual performing members is
closely limited and does not require trust and confidence in the
same manner that the work of a physician or lawyer requires
them . . . . [T]he duty of a teacher is to follow the orders of
superiors .205
A fundamental problem in trying to apply an educational malpractice
cause of action is that education, itself, is not a profession, at least not
in the sense of medicine and law. Professionalism may be considered a
continuum with true "professions" at one end and "professionals, in name
only," at the other end of the continuum. Medicine and law, for example,
have historically been accepted as true professions, and are at one end
of the continuum. Those fields of endeavor at the opposite end of the
continuum have acquired the label of profession but do not meet any of
the criteria against which a profession is measured. A semi-profession,
such as teaching, can be placed in the middle on this continuum. This is
indirectly indicated but the specific placement depends on the extent to
which the semi-profession meets the established criteria of a profession.
Education has been compared to nursing and social work, and described
as one of the semi-professions. 20 6 The court has indicated this indirectly
when it applied the "duty of care" rationale.20 7 Professions have a higher
standard of care than do vocational fields. The Court has implied that
education is not a profession by not accepting a higher standard and duty.
Various criteria have been developed to analyze a profession20 8 with
the following thirteen criteria most often used to characterize a profession:
(1) a body of specialized knowledge; (2) autonomous decision-making au-
thority; (3) a constantly-enlarging body of knowledge; (4) rigorous entry-
level requirements; (5) control of entry; (6) self-policing of the profession;
(7) a professional has autonomy; (8) attracts quality aspirants; (9) strong
professional organizations; (10) a professional has freedom of action; (11)
freedom of action and assumption of responsibility; (12) the public trusts
a professional; and, (13) authority is recognized by clients.
These criteria offer a valid argument that education should not be
classified as a profession. Educators do not control entry into or egress
from their "profession". Education, unlike law and medicine, is controlled
205 Halligan, supra note 164 at 676-77.
200 See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SEMI-PROFESSIONS AND THEIR ORGANIZATION
TEACHERS, NURSES, SOCIAL WORKERS, at xi-xvii (1969); GERALD J. GRIFFIN &
JOANNE K. GRIFFIN, HISTORY AND TRENDS OF PROFESSIONAL NURSING, (1973);
AMERICAN ASS'N OF COLLEGES FOR TEACHER EDUCATION BICENTENIAL COMM'N.
Educating a Profession, 5-9 (1976).
207 See discussions supra Part III regarding duty of care.
208 ETZIONI, supra note 206.
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EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE (11)
by a lay board and not a professional board. There is little doctrinaire
"black letter" law in education; there are almost as many educational
opinions as there are educators. This was clearly pointed out in the state-
ment that "the greatest problem with requiring teachers to exercise the
care and skill ordinarily exercised by other members of their profession
is that, unlike the medical profession, educators cannot agree on what
care and skill ordinarily is required in a given situation. '20 9 This analysis
supports the present attitude of courts in not recognizing education as a
profession liable for professional malpractice.
A disproportionately large body of literature exists on the topic of ed-
ucational malpractice. Considering the burgeoning number of articles,
comments and notes, there have been relatively few legal decisions. The
reviews and commentary are largely enthusiastic in recognizing a judicial
remedy for the failure to educate. Since malpractice actions are recognized
in other professions, it almost seems unfair that educators are not exposed
to similar potential litigation. Furthermore, because malpractice has been
found to be legally compensable, malpractice in education should not be
treated any differently.
There is a more powerful argument supporting the recognition of ed-
ucational malpractice: the people may want it recognized. In the products
liability area, the courts eventually fashioned a new cause of action in
direct response to societal demands. Considering the demand for account-
ability, the poor performance of students, and the belief that monetary
compensation will spur improvements in a supposedly failing educational
system, the new tort of educational malpractice may eventually be rec-
ognized. As long as American society must endure the cold, hard reality
that students are graduating from our schools unable to read their di-
plomas, this unrest will continue. These failures and demands for change
could lead to educational reform through the law, specifically the adoption
of an educational malpractice cause of action. Societal demands have not
yet caused the judiciary to reassess its prior findings of public policy
restrictions on educational malpractice actions. As such, educational mal-
practice today remains an "unborn" tort.
" See Blackburn, supra note 94.
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